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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Utah Supreme Court
Case No. 930059
Utah Court of Appeals
Case No. 910634-CA

vs.
BRENT ROLAND WARDEN,

Category No. 2
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Utah to hear this appeal
is pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the Supreme Court of Utah having granted Appellant's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Should Utah adopt a rule of law which holds that the United
States Constitution allows an individual to be seized by any police
officer who reasonably believes there is an imminent danger to the
individual's

life or limb, without judicial

assessment of the

reliability of the information upon which the officer acts?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect - Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c)
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.

Hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(All references are to the transcript of trial and
suppression hearing as
such transcript has been paginated by the
certified shorthand reporter)
WARDEN was charged with violating Provo City Ordinance, §9/416-44, Provo City's equivalent of the State's statute prohibiting
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.

He filed a

motion to suppress all evidence gathered as a result of the stop of
his automobile, claiming that his seizure was unlawful because the
officer who

stopped

his automobile did

not have a

reasonable

suspicion that he had committed a traffic offense or was otherwise
involved in criminal activity.
On

September

18, 1991, a combined

trial

and

suppression

hearing was heard by the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, Judge of the
2

Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah, Provo City Department.

The

only evidence introduced at the hearing was the testimony of Provo
City Officer Devon Jensen who seized WARDEN.

(P. 4-12).

Over

WARDEN'S objection, the trial court allowed the officer to testify
that two (2) unidentified young men had told him that WARDEN had
asked them where he could buy some "coke" so he could drive into a
wall.

(P. 5, 6 ) .

The trial court ruled that the out-of-court

statements of the two (2) unidentified young men could be admitted
because the City was not offering them for the truth of what was
asserted.

(P. 5, 6 ) . The two (2) unidentified young men did not

appear at the suppression hearing, presumably because the City did
not know their identity.

The officer testified that he had no

reason other than the statement of these two (2) unidentified young
men to stop WARDEN.

(P. 11).

After extensive argument in the form of colloquy between the
court and WARDEN'S counsel, the trial court ruled that WARDEN was
properly seized on the theory of a "welfare stop" and that the
relative truth of the statements from the two
young men was irrelevant.

(P. 13-28) .

(2) unidentified

Accordingly, the trial

court denied WARDEN'S Motion to Suppress.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of
WARDEN'S Motion to Suppress.

m

adopted

legitimizing

a

new

rule

automobile stops."

of

law

so doing, the Court of Appeals
"community

caretaker

(Opinion, Case No. 910634-CA, page 7 ) .

The

Court of Appeals also determined that the truth of the out-of-court
statements of the two (2) unidentified young men was irrelevant and
3

that inquiry into the reliability or corroboration of the statement
was therefore unnecessary. (Opinion id., page 9 ) . The Opinion of
the Utah Court of Appeals was filed on December 9, 1992, and has
been published as Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360.

A copy of

the Court of Appeals slip opinion is included in the addendum to
this brief. WARDEN filed a Petition for Rehearing which was denied
by written Order of the Utah Court of Appeals filed on January 4,
1993.

Warden

thereafter

petitioned

for

Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.

this

court's

Writ

of

The petition was granted

on 30 March, 1993.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All references are to the transcript of trial and
suppression hearing as
such transcript has been paginated by the
certified shorthand reporter)
Officer Jensen of the Provo City Police Department was on
patrol at about 2:00 in the morning of May 9, 1991, (page 4 ) .
While driving through the Denny's Restaurant parking lot on the
north end of Provo, he was approached by two

(2) citizens who

walked up to the open window of his automobile door and told the
officer that a male had come up to them and asked them where he
could buy some "coke" so he could drive into a wall (page 5) . They
also described the vehicle the male was driving as a white Pontiac
and gave the officer the plate number (page 6 ) .
The two (2) informants then jumped in their car and drove off.
The officer broadcast the description of the automobile with an
attempt to locate
which was

south

(page 7) and proceeded to University Avenue,
of his

location, because
4

the

individuals had

advised him that they told the male to try downtown (page 7) . The
officer spotted the described vehicle at approximately 12th North
and University Avenue going north (away from the downtown area) as
he was proceeding south (pages 7 and 8) . Officer Jensen made a Uturn and came in right behind the vehicle as it was making a left
turn onto 12 3 0 North from University Avenue

(page 8) •

Officer

Jensen described the driving pattern of the vehicle as "normal" and
indicated that the vehicle had its left turn signal on (page 8 ) •
He also noted that the vehicle turned

into the outside lane,

although he noted that that is a "common thing that most people do
anyway" (page 8 ) .

After following the vehicle for approximately a

block and one-half and noting that it appeared to be going at a
normal rate of speed, the officer made a traffic stop of the
vehicle (page 8 ) .
Officer Jensen testified that he initiated the stop for the
reason that the people back at Denny's had told him that the driver
had an open container between his legs and for the reason that "I
had some concern for the person's mental stability and welfare on
his own behalf, that he w a s — h e had made a threat to his own life"
(pages 8 and 9) .

On questioning

from the court, the officer

indicated that he was making a "welfare" stop, not a DUI stop (page
11).

He indicated that the stop was not based on anything he had

seen but based only upon what the two (2) young men had told him.
Specifically, he was concerned for the person's welfare and mental
stability and that he might have an open container between his legs
(page 11).

The officer did not testify that he had been advised

5

that the open container could be observed to contain any liquid or
that the two

(2) young men were able to observe whether

the

container had markings of an alcoholic beverage or otherwise, [The
trial

court

found

that the

stop was not based

on

reasonable

suspicion of an open container violation (pages 18 and 19)]• On
cross-examination, the officer testified that he did not personally
know these two (2) individuals from prior occasions, that they had
not given reliable information in the past on police matters, or
that he had any idea who they were (page 12).
After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached and asked
the driver for his license and registration (page 9 ) .
noted an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from

The officer

WARDEN'S breath

and that his balance was unsteady (page 29). The officer did not
testify that he observed an open container in the vehicle.
then

performed

officer

noted

officer's

a walk-and-turn
that WARDEN had

instructions

satisfactorily

and

(page 29) .

and

a one-leg-stand

a difficult
completing

time
the

WARDEN

test. The

following
sobriety

the
test

WARDEN was arrested on the probable

cause that he was driving under the influence

of alcohol

and

transported to take an intoxilyzer test which recorded a blood
alcohol content of .080 (pages 29 and 30).
SUMMARY OF ^THE ARGUMENT
A warrantless seizure of an individual is not reasonable for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
where the seizure is based solely on a police officer's good faith
belief that information provided to him by a third party would
6

justify the seizure. The seized person is entitled to judicial
assessment of the reliability of the facts and circumstances of the
information giving rise to the seizure.

The Utah Court of Appeals

erred in its holding that the truth of the information provided to
the officer was irrelevant to a determination of the lawfulness of
the seizure.
ARGUMENT
PREFACE TO ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the concept of a
"community

caretaking

impression in Utah.

automobile

stop"

is

an

issue

of

first

(Opinion, pages 3 and 4) . The Court therefore

turned to holdings from several other jurisdictions for guidance in
developing the new concept.
the Court of Appeals
officer

personally

Eight (8) of the cases referred to by

involved

observed

fact settings where the seizing
the

circumstances

leading

to

a

community caretaking automobile stop. United States v. Dunbar, 470
Fed. Sup. 704 Dist. of Conn., afffd, 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir., 1979);
State v. Goetaski. 507 A.2d 751 (New Jersey Sup. Ct. 1986), cert,
denied 517 A.2d 443 (New Jersey 1986); McDouqal v. State, 580 S.2d
324 (Florida Ct. App. 1991); State v. Parker, 503 A.2d 809 (New
Hampshire 1985); State v. Chisolm, 696 P. 2d 41 (Wash. App. Ct.
1985); Russell v. Municipality erf Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985); Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9 (Alaska Ct. App.
1986); and Ozhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
The ninth case, State v. Anderson, 417 NW.2d 411 (Wise. Ct.
App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 454 NW.2d 763 (Wisq. 1990), was
7

relied upon heavily by the Court of Appeals in formulating its
three-tiered test.

In Anderson it is not clear whether the seizing

officers personally observed the activity giving rise to the stop
of Anderson's automobile.
cites to the Anderson

But the Utah Court of Appeals 1 Opinion

court's determination

that such

a stop

"requires an objective analysis of the circumstances confronting
the police officer, including the nature and reliability of his for
herl information, with a view toward determining whether the police
conduct was reasonable and justified."

(Emphasis added) (Opinion,

page 6 ) .
In this case, the officer did not personally

observe any

activity on the part of WARDEN that would have justified a stop for
penal, investigatory, or welfare reasons.

The stop was based

totally on information provided to the officer by two (2) unknown
young men who did not appear or give testimony at the suppression
hearing. The information was not verified or corroborated. The
historical veracity of the two (2) young men was unknown because
their identity was unknown.
examination.

They were not subjected to cross-

The truthfulness and accuracy of their statement was

not assessed by the trial court.

Their credibility was deemed

irrelevant by the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, in contrast ta the fact settings of the majority
of the cases referred to and in contrast to the referenced language
of Anderson, the Court

of Appeals held

that the

out-of-court

statements here were properly admitted to "[evaluate] the manner in
which a reasonable officer would respond given this information);,]"
8

and

that

statements

the
as

trial

court

evidence

of

was

correct

verbal

in

acts,

substantive truth11 (Opinion, page 9) .

"admitt[ing]
and

not

these

for

their

In so doing, just as the

trial court had, the Utah Court of Appeals reasoned that the truth
of the statement made to the officer was irrelevant and that the
seizure could be upheld on the strength of "the officer's belief
that the circumstances were exigent, requiring him to take action
for Warden's safety" (Opinion, page 9 ) .
WARDEN agrees with the Utah Court of Appeal's assessment that
the stopping of an automobile and the detention of its occupants is
a seizure which must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979). WARDEN also concedes that "[i]t would be too extravagant to
contend that a benign purpose of rendering assistance could never
justify the stop of a motorist."
Sup. 7 04 (Dist. of Conn.).
that

a

seizure

can

be

United States v Dunbar, 470 Fed.

But this Court has never before held

lawfully

effected

based

solely

on

an

officer's good faith belief that the seizure is justified, and the
reliability of information forming the basis for a seizure has
never before been held irrelevant by this Court.

For the reasons

that follow this Court should not so rule now.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
There is not a universally accepted standard of review in Utah
for the determination of the legality of a seizure.

In State v

Mendoza/Mendieta, 748 P.2d 181 (1987) this Court held as follows:
In determining whether the facts support a reasonable
suspicion that a vehicle is engaged in illegal activity,
9

the trial court must consider the totality of the
circumstances facing the officers. (Citation).
The
reviewing court should not overturn the trial court's
determination unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.
In footnote #3 of State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (1991), this
Court explained its earlier statements on the issue of the proper
standard of review of admission of evidence:
We acknowledge that some of our cases have stated that
the
standard
of
review
for
certain
threshold
constitutional questions is whether the trial court
committed
clear error or abused
its discretion.
(Citations). However, a closer inspection of those cases
reveals that the 'abuse of discretion1 terminology is
used inappropriately.
Whether a piece of evidence is
admissible is a question of law, and we always review
questions
of
law
under
a
correctness
standard.
(Citations).
....

In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit, which
includes the determination of which version of facts to
believe, we review for correctness. But a correctness
review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial
court's resolution of the factual questions and the
associated determination of credibility that may underlie
the decision to admit.
This subsidiary determination
will be overturned only if clearly erroneous.
Again, it is possible that we might refer casually to
this standard of review as an 'abuse of discretion1
standard.
In fact, it is not.
It is a correctness
standard, which incorporates a clearly erroneous standard
for the review of subsidiary factual determinations.
In State v Gardiner, 814 P. 2d 568 (1991) , this court seemed to
apply this bifurcated standard of review generally to all legal
issues having subsidiary factual determinations:
[I]n cases involving mixed questions of fact and law
where the judge makes a determination on contested facts,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's ruling and reverse only if the necessary
factual findings implicit in the court's ruling lack
sufficient evidentiary support.
(Citations)
In
reviewing the application of the law to those facts and
findings, we apply a correctness standard and reverse if
the legal standard is not satisfied.
10

In State v. Brown, 201 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4 (1992), this court,
citing to Ramirez, specifically applied the bifurcated standard of
review to reviews of rulings on motions to suppress (this standard
was applied by this panel of the Utah Court of Appeals in this
case, see Opinion, page 3 ) :
We review the factual findings underlying the trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. We review
the trial court•s conclusions of law based on these facts
under a correctness standard.
This bifurcated standard of review of a motion to suppress
evidence involving the seizure of a motorist in southern Utah was
also applied by the 10th Federal Circuit Court in United States v.
Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991):
At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence,
together with the inferences, deductions and conclusions
to be drawn from the evidence, are all matters to be
determined by the trial judge. (Citations) Accordingly,
we review the evidence in a light favorable to the
district court's determination.
Id.
The ultimate
determination
of reasonableness
under the
Fourth
Amendment, however, is a determination of law that we
review de novo. (Citation)
In State v. Thurman. 203 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 (1993), this Court
extensively

discussed

the

policy

considerations

involved

in

determining the proper standard of review and again applied the
bifurcated standard of review to two issues having mixed questions
of fact and law -

voluntariness of consent and attenuation.

Notwithstanding Ramirez, Gardiner, Brown, Walker, and Thurman,
there is still much disagreement and confusion among practitioners
and courts concerning the proper standard of review to be applied
to

the

determination

of

the

legality
11

of

a

seizure.

(See

"Investigatory Stops Revisited", Sharon Kishner and Judge Lynn W.
Davis, Utah Bar Journal, Vol 6 No. 5, page 10, May, 1993).
probably

attributable

to the

This is

fact that, while the cases

have

applied the bifurcated standard to reviews of rulings on motions to
suppress and to issues involving mixed questions of fcict and law
generally

(Gardiner, Brown, and Walker), this Court has not yet

specifically applied the bifurcated standard to the* determination
of the legality of a seizure and as yet has not distinguished,
explained, or overruled Mendoza.
This confusion is exemplified by the recent case of State v.
Rochelle, 210 Ut. Adv. Rep. 40 (Ut. App. 1993) which was decided
after all of the foregoing Utah Supreme Court cases.

The three-

judge panel in Rochelle unanimously affirmed the trial court's
denial of Rochelle's motion to suppress, finding the detention and
pat-down of Rochelle reasonable.

However, while the author of the

lead opinion applied a bifurcated

standard

of review, two

(2)

judges of the panel concurred separately to emphasize that the
trial court's ultimate finding on reasonable suspicion to detain
and

reasonableness

of a pat-down

search was properly

reviewed

against a clearly erroneous standard:
The lead opinion erroneously implies we are reviewing the
trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion for
correctness. The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally
stated that a trial court's ultimate finding of
reasonable suspicion is to be given deference by a
reviewing court. State v Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181,183 (Utah
1987) .
A reviewing court may therefore disturb a trial court's
finding of reasonable suspicion only if it is clearly
erroneous.
12

WARDEN

urges

that

this

Court

has

clearly

stated

its

determination that the bifurcated standard of review is proper for
issues involving mixed questions of fact and law; that a stop of an
automobile and seizure of its occupants (whether on suspicion of
criminality

or

for

community

caretaking

reasons)

necessarily

involves mixed questions of fact and law; and that the proper
standard of review of the legality of such a seizure is therefore
to show deference to the trial court's subsidiary factual findings
but to review the ultimate determination of the reasonableness of
the seizure for correctness.

A clear statement explaining or

distinguishing Mendoza in light of the foregoing recent holdings of
this Court would certainly be helpful to the bench and bar who
practice in this field.
POINT I
THE SECOND TIER OF THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE
STOP" TEST DEVELOPED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MISAPPLIES THE "HYPOTHETICAL REASONABLE OFFICER" STANDARD OF
THE PRETEXT STOP DOCTRINE
The Utah Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of the
second tier of the "community caretaking automobile" test is to
determine

whether

"under

the

given

circumstances,

would

a

reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a purpose consistent
with community caretaker functions?"

(Opinion, page 7 ) .

The

Opinion cites to State v. Lopez, 831 P. 2d 1040 at 1046 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1992) for an explanation of the "reasonable officer" standard.
The Court of Appeals has misapplied the "reasonable officer"
standard of Lopez to the "community caretaker automobile stop." In
Lopez the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard in the context
13

of the pretext stop doctrine was discussed in detail.

The Lopez

court explained:
In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in cases where an
officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor
traffic violation, but where the court determines the
stop was not made because of the traffic violation but
rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and,
therefore, the officer has deviated from the normal
course of action expected of a reasonable officer.
(Citation omitted).
We have articulated the pretext
doctrine as whether a "reasonable...officer, in view of
the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her,
would have stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation
absent the unconstitutional motivation.
The proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer
could validly have made the stop. State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d at 978 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
The "hypothetical reasonable officer" test in the context of
the pretext

stop doctrine necessarily

begins with a threshold

finding that a bona fide traffic violation occurred.

Only after

the predicate of a minor offense has been established is there an
assessment of whether the minor offense was used as a pretext by
the

officer

activity.

to unreasonably

search

for more

serious

criminal

See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (failure to use turn

signal); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (following too closely);
and State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880
signal).

(failure to turn off turn

The pretext doctrine assesses whether a "hypothetically

reasonable officer" would have stopped the vehicle for the minor
violation, but for an unconstitutional motivation.

Step one—did

an offense

officer have

occur?

Step two—would

a reasonable

bothered to stop the driver for that offense?
However,
automobile

the

stop"

second
test

tier

purports
14

of
to

the

"community

apply

the

caretaker

"hypothetical

reasonable officer" standard to the determination of whether a
reason exists for the stop in the first place.

In this regard, the

second tier of the test distorts the reasoning and purpose behind
the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard. While the Court of
Appeals stated that the second tier is a test of the reasonableness
of the actions of the officer "based on an objective analysis"
(Opinion, page 7) , when applied to the facts of this case it can be
seen that the meaning of the "hypothetical reasonable officer"
standard and the roles of the trial court and the officer become
blurred in the context of the "community caretaking automobile
stop" test.
Properly applied, the "hypothetical reasonable officer" test
is meant to prevent an overzealous officer from bootstrapping a
relatively

minor

offense

that

would

be

disregarded

by

a

"hypothetical reasonable officer" into an unjustified investigation
of a hunch.

As applied in the context of the "community caretaking

automobile stop" - as this case demonstrates - the principal can be
improperly used to provide a basis for a seizure where sufficient
evidence to support the seizure is not otherwise available to the
court.

It is inconsistent for the Court of Appeals to hold in this

case that on the one hand the reasons for the stop must be "based
upon an objective analysis" while on the other hand that the truth
of the statement from the two (2) unidentified young men (which
formed the sole basis for the seizure) is irrelevant.

This new

test does not simply gauge whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop but whether the officer reasonably believed he could

15

make the stop.

In other words, the second tier of the test only

"objectively analyzes" whether the officer acted in good faith in
believing that he had a reason to stop the car.
WARDEN argues that the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning
the second tier of the test insofar as the test only demands that
the officer reasonably believe there is justification
seizure.

for the

It is the court, rather than the officer, that should be

making findings of fact and a determination of reasonableness of
the stop by independently assessing the reliability and strength of
the evidence properly before it. WARDEN is somewhat surprised that
in this case both the trial court and the Court of Appeals allowed
the officer to usurp the court's role.

Under this test, the role

of the trial court is reduced from its proper function of trying
the facts to simply assessing the reasonableness of the officer's
reaction to hypothetical (but not proved) facts.
defendant at the suppression hearing

The role of the

is essentially

eliminated

because the relative truth of the facts substantiating the seizure
is deemed irrelevant and therefore challenging the reliability of
the information is unnecessary.

This, of course, is not how the

system or court is intended to function.

As another panel of the

Court of Appeals reasoned in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Ut App
1988), a "reviewing court [musty assess the reasonableness of the
police action against an objective standard, not the subjective
good faith of the individual officer."
WARDEN strongly urges this Court to make it clear that the
trial

court

-

and

not

the

officer
16

- makes

findings

on

the

sufficiency of the evidence in determining the reasonableness of a
seizure.

It should be made clear that the trial court does not

defer

the

to

officer's

determination

of

the

credibility

and

reliability of witnesses. This Court can do so by holding that the
second tier of the "community caretaking automobile stop" must
objectively analyze the evidence supporting the seizure rather than
the officer's good faith beliefs.
In

this

case,

because

the

statement

from

the

two

(2)

unidentified young men was not admitted for its truth, the evidence
before the trial court could not support the stop of WARDEN'S
automobile.

The lower courts' reliance on the good faith beliefs

of the seizing officer was misplaced as was the Court of Appeals1
reference to the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard.

This

Court should take this opportunity to dispel any implication in the
holding of the Utah Court of Appeals that an individual can be
seized on the basis of an officer's good

faith that there is

justification for the seizure, whether for criminal or caretaking
purposes.

POINT II
THE SECOND TIER OF THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE
STOP" TEST CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF UTAH WHICH HAVE FOUND A "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION
INAPPROPRIATE IN THE CONTEXT OF WARRANTLESS SEIZURES AND ARRESTS
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was not error for the trial
court

to

admit

the

out-of-court

statements

of

the

two

(2)

unidentified young men through the testimony of the officer at the
17

suppression hearing, reasoning that the information from the two
(2) unidentified young men was not admitted for the truth asserted,
rather "the statements were used to explain the officer's belief
that the circumstances were exigent, requiring him to take action
for Warden's safety."

(Opinion, page 9 ) . Obviously, such a ruling

means that the second tier of the "community caretaking automobile
stop" test does not require the trial court to make an independent
determination of the reliability or credibility of the evidence
supporting the stop.

Rather, the test only looks to whether the

officer was objectively reasonable in his belief that the evidence
would justify the stop.

The second tier is a test of the good

faith of the officer.
In State v. Lopez, 451 P.2d 772 (Ut. 1969), the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that the requirement of reasonable cause for a felony
arrest "is not satisfied merely by a showing that an officer acted
in good faith,..."

In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Ut. 1987),

the Utah Supreme Court considered the "good faith" exception of
former §77-35-12 (g) (1) , Utah Code Annotated.

The Mendoza court

determined that the statute was unconstitutional because, among
other reasons, the exception "by its own terms, could never apply
to an investigatory stop and search."
Mendoza

court

reasoned

that

whether

(Mendoza at 185).
or

not

the

"good

The

faith"

exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) applied to
search warrants, the exception could never apply where there is "no
outside authority on which the officers could reasonably rely...."
(Mendoza at 185) . "If no reasonable suspicion exists to justify an
18

investigatory stop, rendering a subsequent search illegal, then the
officer

whose

reasonably."
Decision.

conduct

is

in

question

could

not

have

acted

(Mendoza at 186). Justice Durham wrote the Mendoza

Justice Stewart concurred without comment.

Justices

Zimmerman and Howe concurred that the "good faith" exception cannot
be applied to warrantless searches.

Only Justice Hall reserved

judgment as to whether the exclusionary rule and its Leon "good
faith" exception applies to warrantless searches.
Similarly, in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Ut. 1991), the
Utah Supreme Court ruled on the application of a "good faith"
exception in the context of the Attorney General's investigatory
subpoenas.

Although Thompson involves an interpretation of the

Utah Constitution, the holding analygizes to the reasoning inherent
in Leon and its application to the Constitution of the United
States.

The Thompson court noted that "the touch-tone of the

[Supreme] court's decision was the police officer's objectively
reasonable reliance on the determination of a magistrate or a
legislature that the challenged search in fact met the standards
required by the Fourth Amendment."

(Thompson at 419).

Although no

decision was reached on this exact issue, the Thompson court was
persuasive in its reasoning that the "good faith" exception cannot
apply where there has been no intervening action by a magistrate or
a legislature upon which the officer can reasonably rely.
Howe

authored

the

Opinion

in

Thompson.

Chief

Justice

Justice

Hall

concurred, Justice Zimmerman and Justice Durham concurred. Justice
Stewart dissented without issuing an opinion.
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It
involve

is conceded
welfare

that Lopez, Mendoza, and Thompson

stops.

Nevertheless, these

cases

do not

expose

the

problems inherent in applying the "good faith" exception to any
warrantless seizure not based on prior magisterial or legislative
authority.

It appears that this Court has not sanctioned a "good

faith" exception to warrantless seizures when given the opportunity
to do so. As this Court reasoned in Mendoza, if the officer cannot
articulate

specific

facts

upon

which

the

stop

can

be

deemed

reasonable in the first place thereby making a subsequent search
invalid, the officer cannot have relied in good faith on his own
unreasonableness

so

unreasonableness.

as

to

insulate

the

search

from

his

own

In this context, the distinction between penal

and benign stops is a distinction without a difference.
Further, warrantless seizures are per se invalid, Katz v»
United States, 3 89 US 347 (1967) .

The State has the burden of

establishing an exception to the constitutional requirement for a
warrant, Lopez, supra.

If the officer is allowed to assert his

good faith belief in the statement of the two

(2) unidentified

young men and if the State is not required to establish to the
court's satisfaction, the truth of the young men's statement, then
the

State

exception

has

not

established

to the warrant

a

constitutionally

requrrement

recognized

and the burden has been

impermissibly shifted to the Defendant to disprove the officer's
good faith.
Even if such a shifting of burdens was permissible, how could
the Defendant ever disprove the officer's good faith?.
20

The second tier of the "community caretaking automobile stop"
test emphasizes the objective reasonableness of the seizing officer
rather than the reliability of the evidence upon which the officer
relies (in this case the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
statement from the two (2) unidentified young men was not admitted
for its substantive truth).

As such, this second tier allows for

stops based only upon the officer's objective good faith.

This

Court has previously held that a warrantless seizure cannot be
based only on the officer's good faith. This Court should hold the
"community caretaking automobile stop" concept developed by the
Court

of

Appeals

invalid

insofar

as

it

focuses

only

on

the

officer's good faith as opposed to the reliability of the evidence
purportedly justifying the stop.
POINT III
THE SECOND TIER OF THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE
STOP" TEST IS IN CONFLICT WITH CASE LAW ESTABLISHED IN
HOLDINGS FROM SEVERAL JURISDICTIONS ENTERED IN
ANALOGOUS CASES
Because the question presented in this case is one of first
impression in Utah, it was appropriate for the Court of Appeals to
turn to case law developed in analogous cases for guidance in the
formulation of a test to determine if WARDEN was properly seized.
While the Court of Appeals looked at other "welfare stop" cases
from other jurisdictions as noted above, it did not acknowledge or
utilize the case law that has developed

in other relevant and

analogous cases involving seizures based on information provided
from third parties.

Four (4) lines of cases have developed, each

assessing a different type of third party information:
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(a) the

"fellow officer11 rule,

(b) informant tips in Terry stops, (c)

informant tips in requests for search warrants, and (d) "citizen"
tips in requests for search warrants. None of these lines of cases
allows an officer to effect a seizure based solely on his good
faith

reliance

on the

information provided

to him; each

line

requires an assessment of the reliability and/or corroboration of
the facts provided to the officer.
(a) "Fellow officer" rule:
In Whitelev v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S.
560 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that an arrest
conducted by a Laramie, Wyoming, patrolman was invalid despite the
patrolman's reliance on a bulletin requesting aid in the service of
an arrest warrant issued by the Sheriff of Carbon County, Wyoming.
It was determined that the information available to the Carbon
County Sheriff was itself inadequate to justify the arrest warrant.
In

holding

that

the

Laramie

patrolman's

arrest

was

likewise

invalid, the Supreme Court noted:
Certainly police officers called upon to aid other
officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to
assume that the officers requesting aid offered the
magistrate information requisite to support independent
judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however,
the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal
arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision
of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to
make the arrest.
Later, in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), the
United States Supreme Court applied the "fellow officer" principal
enunciated in Whiteley to investigative (Terry) stops. Hensley was
stopped by officers from one Ohio city for investigation of an
22

armed

robbery.

The seizing officers relied on a bulletin or

"flyer" that had been issued by officers from another Ohio city.
The Supreme Court upheld Hensley1s seizure.

But in so doing the

court, referring to the Whiteley principal held:
We conclude that, if a flyer or bulletin has been issued
on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that the wanted person has committed an
offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin
justifies a stop to check identification.
If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a
reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective
reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment.
Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective
reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the
evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is
admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin
possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop.
In Utah, both this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
followed

the

Whiteley/Hensley

"fellow

officer"

rule

and

have

required that the issuing officer have a constitutional basis for
police intrusion in order for the responding officer's seizure to
be valid.

In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) this Court

made extensive reference to both Whiteley and Hensley in upholding
an investigatory stop by responding officers, ultimately finding
that the broadcast for aid was issued "by officers possessing 'a
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. 1 "

In State v. Roth, 827

P.2d 255 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals cited to
Hensley and Bruce in holding that information originating from two
(2) identified University of Utah Medical Center security officers
that Roth was "getting vocal," his eyes were glazed, his speech
slurred, he smelled strongly of alcohol, he had trouble standing,
23

and he continually

started

and

stalled his red

Pontiac

Fiero

automobile provided sufficient and reasonable suspicion that could
be relied upon by a responding officer to stop Roth on suspicion of
driving under the influence of alcohol.

In State v. Seel, 827 P.2d

954 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals cited to both
Henslev and Bruce in holding a responding officer's seizure of Seel
for suspicion of burglary valid.

The court found that "the officer

who dispatched the radio message was cognizable of articulable
facts

supporting

a

reasonable

suspicion

that

defendant

had

committed the burglaries."
In none of these cases did these courts consider the truth of
the information upon which the seizing officer acted irrelevant.
Nor did any of these courts uphold seizures based solely on the
seizing officer's objective good faith reliance on the truth of the
information transmitted
focused

on

the

to him.

substance

of

Rather, each of these courts
the

originating

dispatch

and

scrutinized the information transmitted for sufficient reasonable
suspicion.
(b) Informant tips in Terry stops:
Several courts have reviewed the legality of an investigatory
stop made by an officer who is relying upon information provided to
him from a confidential informant.

These cases universally hold

that the seizing officer cannot "bootstrap" his authority by simply
pointing to his reasonable reliance on the information provided to
him.

Rather, the cases hold that the underlying information must

be reliable.
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In 1968 the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark
cases of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its companions,
Sibron v. New York, and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
These were the first cases in which the Supreme Court delineated
the concept of a "stop and frisk" based on a police officer's
personal observation of facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.

Later, in

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143

(1972), the Supreme Court determined that a Terry investigatory
stop could be based on reliable information from an informant as
opposed to the personal observations of the police.

The Supreme

Court noted:
The informant was known to [the officer] personally and
had provided [the officer] with information in the past.
This is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an
anonymous telephone tip. The informant here came forward
personally to give information that was immediately
verifiable at the scene. Indeed, under Connecticut law,
the informant might have been subject to immediate arrest
for making a false complaint had [the officer's]
investigation proved the tip incorrect. Thus, while the
Court's decisions
indicate that this
informant's
unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics
arrest or search warrant . . . the information carried
enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's
forcible stop of Williams.
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the United States
Supreme

Court

considered

an

investigatory

stop

based

on

an

anonymous telephone tip.

Citing to Adams v Williams, the Court

held the stop was valid.

The court began its reasoning by noting

that "a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not 'warrant a
man

of

reasonable

appropriate."
[H]owever,

caution

in

the

belief

that

a

stop

The Court continued:
in this case there
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is more than the tip

was

itself.
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent
on both the content of the information possessed by
police and its degree of reliability.
Both factors quantity and quality - are considered in the "totality of
the circumstances - the whole picture," ... that must be
taken into account when evaluating whether there is
reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively
low degree of reliability, more information will be
required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion
that would be required if the tip were more reliable.
We think it is also important that, as in [Illinois v
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)], "the anonymous [tip]
contained a range of details relating not just to easily
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the
tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily
not easily predicted."
When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were
verified, there was reason to believe not only that the
caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at
least well enough to justify the stop.
Although it is a close case, we conclude that under the
totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as
corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability
to justify the investigatory stop ....
One month later in 1990, the United States Supreme Court
decided United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1990).
The Court upheld an investigatory stop of an automobile based on an
informant's tip that its occupants were heading to rob a particular
bank in another city.
and Alabama v. White.

The court cited to both Adams v. Williams
In validating the stop, the court pointed to

the following: (1) the informant identified herself and was known
by the police to whom she gave her tip, (2) she had given police
reliable

information

on Thompson

in the recent past,

(3) she

described the car in which Thompson would be traveling, (4) she
described his companion, (5) she described the planned crime and
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heroin users were observed coming to the house and leaving after
short intervals.
the house.

Each day the same automobile was seen parked at

On the day preceding the arrest, this car arrived at

the house at 8:30 a.m. and two (2) Mexican males exited the car and
entered the house.

They remained for about four (4) hours during

which time several known and suspected heroin users entered and
left the house through the back door. Upholding the arrests of the
two

(2)

Mexicans,

the

court

stated

"[t]he

independent,

corroborating information received from the informants known to
have been reliable in the past was duly verified by an extended
surveillance."
Similarly, in

State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Ut. Ct. App.

1991), the Utah Court of Appeals cited to Adams v. Williams,
Alabama

v.

White

and

Thompson

and

held

that

"[a]

reasonable

suspicion may be premised on an informant's tip so long as it is
sufficiently reliable."
court made the
Grovier:

"The

The appellate court noted that the trial

following
informant

findings concerning the
was

known

to

Officer

informant

Davis;

he

in
had

previously tipped Davis 10 to 15 times; he reported to Davis that
he observed methamphetamine in an older green Buick Riviera driven
by a male with a female passenger; he identified the license plate
number as either 175 BAT or 175 -BAP; he last observed the vehicle
on the south end of Main Street in Cedar City."
court

determined

the

informant's

tip

reliable

The appellate
based

on

"the

totality of the circumstances."
Again, as with the cases dealing with the fellow officer rule,
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truthful, cogent information, resulting in bodily injury to C.I.111
and who had personally observed contraband at the sight of the
search.

The officer/affiant in Anderton further verified that

Anderton was suspected of selling contraband in quantity.
The informant in State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984)
was not identified in the affidavit because he feared retaliation.
He informed the police he had observed stolen tools and car parts
in the possession of a person who had admitted stealing them in a
burglary.

The same person also admitted to stealing a car.

The

police checked the informant's record and confirmed he had no
felony arrests and that he was not a suspect in any crimes.
informant

had

given

reliable

regarding stolen vehicles.

information

in

the

past,

The
also

The police verified the* burglary, the

stolen goods and auto parts, and that the vehicle had been reported
stolen. The informant's description of the suspect's apartment was
also corroborated by the police. The suspect's friend was found to
have an extensive record for burglary and auto theft.
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (1985), this Court again
upheld

a

search

warrant

based

totally

on

information

informants who had given reliable information in the past.
informant gave
officer/affiant.

information of cultivation

of marijuana

from
One

to the

The same information was independently provided

to a fellow officer from another informant.

Both informants had

provided reliable information in the past.

The affiant officer

corroborated certain aspects of the information from the two (2)
informants by making personal observations of fencing.described by
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the

cite where the warrant was served.

The affiant consulted with

other narcotics detectives whose own informants also pointed to
drug activity at the suspected cite. The affiant performed several
corroborating acts to verify that the information gained from the
three (3) informants was internally consistent.
the

warrant

primarily

because

of

the

The court upheld

repeated

corroborating

controlled buys from the cite and other corroborating factors.
Similarly, in State v. Singleton, 214 Ut. Adv. Rep. 30 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals reviewed a warrant issued on
the strength of information derived cumulatively
informants.

from four (4)

Again, the court noted that the information from the

four (4) informants was internally consistent, the officer/affiant
verified much of the information, and one (1) of the informants
participated in controlled buys from the defendant.

The warrant

was upheld.
Once again, in these cases, the courts were concerned with
verification, corroboration, consistency of information derived
from multiple sources, and historical reliability of the informant.
Although not requiring all these elements of reliability to be
present as to any single informant, none of these cases upheld a
search

based

solely

on

the

finding

that

the

officer/affiant

exhibited objective good faith in the information he had gathered.
Again, these courts required sufficient indicia of reliability in
the

information

itself as evidenced

by consistency with

other

intelligence, past reliability of the informant, the officer's
personal observation of corroborating or verifying factors, etc.
32

(d)

"Citizen" tips in requests for search warrants:

The Lv,
pel ice

::/.'*

as

• case had not hnon used b;;r the

rormant

J

consideration tci their informatic

"

sometimes a . . ^ i , ^

;, .,

routinely

uitiiiiiy

recM

nothing

In

informants of thi s type are

common I >

The c a s e s

t eceived

' '"'Ci t:i zei it :i i: if' Drmai i t s "

^au sometimes

• * ntizen

remain

informants

anonymous.

are

presumed

r
ci'viv."

..r

.i lemuneratioii.

[IjT^
.'eraj*_ neighbor witness is not the type of
informant in need of independent proof of reliability or
veracity. Rather, '[v]eracity is generally presumed when
the information comes from an average citizen who is in
a position to supply information by virtue of having been
a crime victim or witness. 1
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d
175 (Utah 1983) (quoting LaFavre, Search and Seizure
sectirr ^ ~'
-i r \ —r r~\ \

I? t e r'^

t

i n n . ^ * * • oucjh . p \ ^ r t h r v - p - " a r e s *-'*•»f rjp=t i w ' 11" •" * * i *r*'-r

i
take n,-te c: i nc external indicia oi reliability or trie intormar, n
received from them.
1

•_ .x

Treadwav, 499 P.2d 8-G (Utah I''1;

i

^

other < dentil led persons -:
subject

'

bidie

< . iti/,en war- knou

police because o f M r* former p'xr* it • C T
H

•

;tice
:

<_ i

t

v .

lac

"f *~u* ^ ' * ^
:

observed control !"d substances .

t *>e

premises.
. ;\: : :: a *. :~L : , ,. . .. .i

operatic
police, in

State v. Miller,
LUXII,

persona

a suspectea

y

a I * < (C ct App . c.<£

1- • T* • 1 * ' •

•

* <~

arug
e

'• '

two (2) swamp coolers blowing constantly into a bermed-up basement,
a vented

furnace-like apparatus in a boarded-up garage, and a

series of grow lights.

The neighbors had reported observing the

occupants mixing peat moss, although the yard had never been cared
for.

A traffic survey conducted by the police identified cars of

several known drug users coming and going from the residence in the
early morning hours, staying only briefly.

Neighbors had also

observed a U-Haul truck on several occasions loading and unloading
from a side door hidden from view at late hours.

The neighbors

reported that the garage doors were never open to public view.
They also reported two (2) large dogs about when the occupants were
mixing peat moss, but that the dogs always remained inside at other
times.

Utah Power & Light records indicated power lines servicing

the residence that were three (3) times larger than necessary for
a normal home, power consumption of four (4) to five (5) times in
excess of normal, with one monthly bill of Two Thousand

Four

Hundred Dollars ($2,400.00).

The power company had been denied

access to the electric meter.

One (1) of the occupants had a prior

record for possession of marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms and
appeared "suspicious" to the neighbors.
possession of marijuana.
stacks

of

plastic

Another had a record for

The officer/affiant personally observed

buckets

and- detailed

in his

affidavit

how

furnaces can be used to dry marijuana plants, how swamp coolers can
humidify

and

vent

a

growing

area,

and

how

large

electrical

consumption, the truck, and grow lights can be associated with
marijuana and mushroom production.
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The officer corroborated the informant's information

by personally observing persons entering and leaving the residence
after

very

experience

short
with

intervals

narcotics

-

consistent

trafficking.

with
The

the

officers

officer

further

verified that the occupant of the residence was the person the
informant identified through personal observation, police records,
and driver's license records.
occupant

had

a

previous

The officer also confirmed that the

arrest

for

possession

of

controlled

substance with intent to distribute.
In State v. White, 210 Ut. Adv. Rep. 59 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993)
two (2) family members, apparently concerned about their relative's
drug use provided the police with information about the location of
their relative's drug purchases.

The Utah Court of Appeals noted

that the informants were of the "concerned citizen" type whose
credibility and reliability needed no verification.
the

appellate

court

was

still

careful

to

point

Nevertheless,
out

how

the

information the two (2) citizens had supplied carried independent
indicia

of

reliability:

each

informant

independently

observed

incidents when the close family member purchased cocaine at the
subject

premises, each

citizen

independently

indicated

to the

officer/affiant that the close family member for whom each was
concerned had a long history of-drug abuse, the court noted that
each informant corroborated and buttressed the other.

Further,

despite categorizing the informants as "citizens" not needing proof
of reliability, the court additionally pointed to verification
methods employed by the investigating officer/affiant: he verified
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The court concluded:
I n s j l o r t / the hearsay evidence contained in the affidavit
possessed adequate indicia of reliability. Moreover,
corroborating evidence provides the hearsay with a
substantial
basis
i 01
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»

consideration of the issues in this case.

First, there does not

appear to be a bright-line test for definitively determining when
a given informant is a "citizen informant" to be accorded the
presumption of reliability.

While the two (2) informants in the

case at bar did not seek or receive remuneration and have not been
routinely used by the police as informants, it does not necessarily
follow that they are deserving of the presumption of reliability.
Because

WARDEN

was

unable

to

probe

into

their

character,

motivation, or their ability to perceive and relate facts, at the
suppression hearing and because neither the trial court nor the
Court

of

Appeals

required

the

government

to

establish

their

veracity, reliability, or credibility, it can only be noted that in
some respects they are similar to "citizen informants."
be

logically

and

conclusively

determined

that

It cannot
they

were

altruistically concerned for WARDEN'S well-being or that they were
not upset with WARDEN for cutting them off in traffic or beating
them to a parking space or that they were not just kids simply
playing a joke on the police and/or WARDEN.

In sum, it cannot be

blindly assumed that every informant who does not give his name or
who asks for no consideration

is entitled to a presumption of

reliability.
Second,

as

each

of

thBse

"citizen

informant"

cases

demonstrate, courts have given lip service to the presumption of
credibility for "citizen informants" but, at the same time the same
courts take care to note the existence of external

indicia of

reliability and/or corroboration or other verification.factors that
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CONCLUSIONS
Any police seizure of an individual

in Utah

(whether for

penal, regulatory, or "welfare" purposes) based on information
provided by third parties (whether fellow officers, snitches, or
"citizen informants") ought not be condoned unless the third party
information

is determined

corroborated or verified.

by the court to be reliable

and/or

It is improper for a court to justify a

police seizure only because the officer appeared to be objectively
reasonable in his belief in the truth of the information provided
by third parties.
The "reasonable officer" language of the second tier of the
Court of Appeals1 "community caretaker automobile stop" test is in
conflict with previous holdings of this Court.

Because the test

does not require the police to act only on reliable information, it
is vulnerable

to abuse by pranksters, dishonest

vindictive informants.

officers, and

In its present form, the test provides for

no probing or inquiry by the trial court or defendant beyond the
officer's good faith beliefs.
While this Court may determine that there is a valid reason to
justify a non-penal seizure of an individual in Utah, it should
replace the

"reasonable officer" language used in the second tier

of the test with

language which more properly

focuses on the

totality of the facts and circumstances available to the officer,
including assessments of the reliability of the information and any
corroborating factors.

This Court should consider whether it is

proper for individuals to be seized by the police simply because
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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Brent Warden appeals his conviction of driving
under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Provo City Ordinance section 9/41-6-44. Warden
challenges both the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and its guilty verdict. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At about 2:00 a.m. on the morning of May 9, 1991, Officer
Jensen of the Provo City Police Department was on patrol. As he
drove through a Denny's Restaurant parking lot, two men
approached his car. They told the officer that a male had just
asked them where he could buy some cocaine so he could "drive
himself into a wall." The men described the car which the male
was driving and supplied Officer Jensen with the license plate
number. They also told him that the male was probably heading
towards downtown Provo. The men then immediately returned to
their car and drove away. Officer Jensen broadcast the vehicle
description and plate number to all other units in an attempt to
locate the male driver, and then left the parking lot to look for

the driver himself. He drove towards downtown Provo and spotted
the car on University Avenue. Officer Jensen made a U-turn to
come in behind the vehicle and followed it for approximately a
block and'a half. The male driver made a left turn and traveled
at a normal rate of speed. Officer Jensen flashed his lights and
the car stopped.
After stopping the car, Officer Jensen approached Warden,
the car's driver, and asked him for his driver's license and
registration. After observing Warden, the officer noted that his
breath smelled of alcohol and that he was unsteady on his feet.
On that basis, Officer Jensen administered a standcird battery of
field sobriety tests. When Warden failed to satisfactorily
complete the tests, Officer Jensen arrested him for driving under
the influence. Officer Jensen transported Warden to the police
station where an intoxilyzer test recorded a .08 percent blood
alcohol content.
At trial, Officer Jensen testified that the only basis he
had for the traffic stop was the information provided by the two
unidentified men. According to the officer, he was concerned
about the "person's mental stability and welfare on his own
behalf." Upon the court's own questioning, the reason for the
stop was further clarified:
The Court:
stop?

Any other reason at all for the

Officer Jensen: Basically, the s t o p — I was
concerned for this person's welfare and
mental stability.
The Court:
view?

It was a welfare stop in your

Officer Jensen: In my view, yes, it was a
welfare stop for this person. I t — a t the
time that I made the stop, I wasn't basing
the stop on a DUI stop, that's what it later
turned up to be; but I was basing the stop on
a welfare check for this individual's
wellbeing.
Although the court noted that there was no reasonable
suspicion that Warden was engaged in criminal activity when
Officer Jensen stopped him, it denied Warden's motion to suppress
the evidence seized as a result of the stop. The court ruled
that when a police officer receives unverified information that a
person is about to harm him or herself and makes a "welfare stop"
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based upon that information, the officer is entitled to proceed
with an arrest based upon evidence of crimes discovered during
the welfare stop. The court found Warden guilty and this appeal
followed.
ISSUES
The central question presented on appeal is one of first
impression in Utah: Are law enforcement officers authorized to
make "welfare" stops of citizens? If so, under what
circumstances will such stops be lawful? Warden also claims on
appeal that the trial court erred in considering inadmissible
hearsay evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In absence of clear error, the trial court's findings of
fact underlying its decision to grant or deny the suppression
motion must be upheld." State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted); State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d
1033, 1033 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. No. 920246, slip op.
at
(Utah November 3, 1992). "However, as for the trial
court's legal conclusions in regards thereto, the correction of
error standard applies." Steward, 806 P.2d at 215 (citation
omitted).
ANALYSIS
Community Caretaker Stops
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to a person's
automobile. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct.
1391, 1396 (1979); see also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132,
1135 (Utah 1989) ("Although a person has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile.").
The Fourth Amendment is "implicated . . . because stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a xseizure'
. . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.
Ct. at 1396. "Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police
officers from randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the
highway." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992)
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(citing Prouse. 440 U.S. at 654-56, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-98), cert,
granted, No. 920319, slip op. at
(Utah October 27, 1992).
Specific situations in which police officers are justified
in making stops of citizens in their vehicles include the
following:
(1) When the officer observes the driver
commit a traffic violation;
(2) when the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver is
committing a traffic offense, such as driving
under the influence of alcohol or driving
without a license; and
(3) when the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver is
engaged in more serious criminal activity,
such as transporting drugs.
Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043 (citations omitted); see also State v.
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (describing three
levels of police-citizen encounters requiring different degrees
of justification under the Fourth Amendment). An officer's
reasonable articulable suspicion must be based upon objective
facts apparent to the officer at the time of the stop. State v.
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). "Whether there are
objective facts to justify such a stop depends on the *totality
of the circumstances.'"
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah
1987)).
Utah appellate case law has not yet addressed, however, the
legitimacy of police vehicle stops unrelated to a penal or
regulatory purpose. Therefore, the trial court's recognition of
the stop of Warden's vehicle as lawful because it was prompted by
a concern for Warden's welfare, presents an issue of first
impression in Utah. Because Utah law provides no guidance on the
propriety of such stops, we look to other jurisdictions on this
issue.
One of the first cases to enunciate a standard for police
stops to assist motorists, unrelated to penal or regulatory
purposes, was United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704 (D.
Conn.), aff'd. 610 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1979). In this case, an
officer stopped a motorist after observing that the license plate
was from a neighboring state and deducing from the manner in
which the driver was proceeding that he was lost.
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Preliminarily, the court noted that "there is no basis for
resolving this dispute without reference to the standards of the
Fourth Amendment.11 Jd. at 706. The court determined that
defendant was seized: " [S]topping an automobile and detaining
its occupants constitute a * seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the purpose of the
stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief." Id.
(quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at 1393). The Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness is analyzed by weighing
the individual's right to personal security against the public
interest. Id.
In assessing the weight to be assigned the public interest,
Dunbar discussed the privacy intrusions which police commit in
furtherance of "community caretaking functions." Id. at 707.1
Dunbar applied the community caretaking concept to vehicle stops,
reasoning that lf[i]t would be too extravagant to contend that a
benign purpose of rendering assistance could never justify the
stop of a motorist." Id. at 707. The court ultimately held,
however, that under the facts before it, the balancing between
the legitimate governmental interest in aiding a motorist and an
individual's right to be free from arbitrary interferences from
law enforcement officers weighed in favor of the individual.
"The Fourth Amendment stands against initiating a new line of
cases in which the officer says, AI thought he was lost.'" Id.
at 708.
Other jurisdictions have utilized the balancing test set
forth in Dunbar with varying results. None, however, has
explicitly rejected the notion that community caretaker concerns
can justify stops and seizures under appropriate circumstances.
For example, some courts discuss the need for a specific set of
circumstances which are "beyond the ordinary, though not
necessarily criminally suspicious" to justify an officer's stop
of a vehicle. State v. Goetaski, 507 A.2d 751, 752-3 (N.J.
Super. 1986), cert, denied, 517 A.2d 443 (N.J. 1986) (driving
slowly on the shoulder of the road at 4:00 a.m. with left-turn
signal blinking, was unusual enough circumstance to warrant the
stop, but barely passed constitutional muster); see also McDougal
v. State, 580 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (stopping
driver to inform him of how to retrieve confiscated firearms is
not a justified circumstance); State v. Parker, 503 A.2d 809, 812
(N.H. 1985) (justifying the stop of a driver of truck and camper
1. Community caretaking functions were defined in Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973), as
"totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute."
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when officer saw a child's head duck behind curtains in camper
while parked in dark parking lot); State v. Chisolm, 696 P.2d
41, 4 3 (Wash. App. 1985) (validating a police officer's momentary
stop of a vehicle to warn the occupants that an item of their
property was endangered); Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage,
706 P.2d 687, 689 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a stop where
a misted rear window could cause traffic hazards); Crauthers v.
State, 727 P.2d 9, 11 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (authorizing officer
checking on a driver stopped near side of road with his window
rolled down when officer reasonably construed situation to be a
request for assistance); but see, Qzhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918,
922 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (invalidating check on two cars parked
together in a campground because circumstances did not support a
reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicles needed
assistance).
Wisconsin articulated a detailed methodology for determining
when a police stop of a vehicle is justified as a community
caretaker activity in State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990).
Police officers had stopped a car at 2:00 a.m. which was thought
to have parked on prior occasions in private business stalls in
the area. The state conceded there was no reasonable basis to
suspect the driver of criminal activity. In Anderson, that court
noted that a test for such police stops "requires an objective
analysis of the circumstances confronting the police officer,
including the nature and reliability of his [or her] information,
with a view toward determining whether the police conduct was
reasonable and justified." Id. at 413. If a community caretaker
function is asserted as justifying a stop,
[t]he trial court must determine: (1) that a
seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether
the police condxact was bona fide community
caretaker activity; and (3) if so, whether
the public need and interest outweigh the
intrusion upon the privacy of the individual.
Id. at 414. When the trial court addresses the third factor and
weighs the public need and interest against the individual's
privacy intrusion, Anderson notes that the following are relevant
considerations:
(1) the degree of the public interest and the
exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant
circumstances surrounding the seizure,
including time, location, the degree of overt
authority and force displayed; (3) whether an
automobile is involved; and (4) the
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availability, feasibility and effectiveness
of alternatives to the type of intrusion
actually accomplished.
Id.
After remand to the circuit court for application of the
enunciated criteria, a second appeal ensued. State v. Anderson,
439 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (Anderson II). In
Anderson II. the court of appeals stated that the trial court's
findings of factf referred to as historical facts, would be
upheld unless they were against "the great weight and clear
preponderance of the evidence." id. at 84 6. The court further
noted that M[w]hether those facts satisfy the constitutional
requirement of reasonableness presents a question of law, and
therefore we are not bound by the trial court's decisions on that
issue." Id. at 847. The court concluded that in this case,
"[g]iven the relatively minor nature of the societal interest and
the alternatives available short of seizure to pursue the matter
. . . the seizure of Anderson's vehicle was unreasonable." Id.
at 848.
Having reviewed case law addressing automobile stops which
are outside the penal and regulatory framework, we believe that
adopting a test describing the criteria for community caretaker
automobile stops is appropriate for the development of Utah's
Fourth Amendment law. We therefore adopt a three tiered t e s t —
modeled in part on Wisconsin's Anderson test—to determine if a
stop is reasonable, and, therefore, lawful under the Fourth
Amendment. The trial court must evaluate the legitimacy of an
alleged community caretaker stop as follows: First, did a
seizure occur under the Fourth Amendment definition of that term?
Second, based upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function—under the
given circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a
vehicle for a purpose consistent with community caretaker
functions? Third, based upon an objective analysis, did the
circumstances demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb?
See Lopez. 831 P.2d at 1046 (describing reasonable officer
standard). Our test differs from the Anderson test in that we
require circumstances threatening life or safety, rather than
using exigent situations as merely a factor in a mix of
considerations.
In adopting this test, we expressly disavow the reasoning in
those cases which have upheld motorist stops when an
insignificant article of the driver's personal property was
endangered or when a motorist appeared to be lost in less than
life-threatening circumstances. While these instances may
represent legitimate community interests, they are entitled to
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slight weight as compared to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, we adopt the requirement of imminent danger
to life or limb as a component of the reasonableness test because
of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of "the right of the people
to be secure" against arbitrary invasions by the government. See
Scheckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 242, 93 S. Ct. 2041,
2055-56 (1973).
We also note that stops which are legitimate exercises of
police community caretaker responsibilities, but which are not
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, may result in
application of the exclusionary rule, while still achieving the
objectives of community caretaking. This appears to be a
legitimate means of encouraging genuine police caretaking
functions while deterring bogus or pretextual police activities.
Test as Applied to this Case
The trial court upheld the validity of this stop as one for
defendant's own welfare, stating that there was no independent
reasonable suspicion to otherwise validate the seizure appealed
by Warden under the Fourth Amendment.2 We conclude that the stop
of Warden's vehicle was permissible under our community caretaker
test and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion
to suppress.
Addressing the first prong of the test, Provo City concedes
that Warden was seized under the Fourth Amendment definition of
that term when the officer stopped his car. Second, based on an
objective standard, we agree with the trial court that a
reasonable police officer would have stopped Warden to help him
because prevention of a suicide is consistent with an officer's
community caretaker function. The officer was not acting within
his duties of detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the commission of crimes. Therefore, we
determine that the officer was acting within a bona fide
community caretaker function. Third, under our test the
circumstances must have posed an imminent danger to life or limb,
as determined by an objective standard. The unidentified men who
informed the officer that Warden was threatening to harm himself
created a reasonable basis upon which the officer could conclude
that Warden was in imminent danger. Further, because it was late
at night and the information given the officer suggested an
immediate threat to Warden's physical safety or life, it was not
reasonable to pursue an alternative means or to take time to try
2. The facts are undisputed as to what happened prior to Officer
Jensen's detention of Warden, as only the officer testified.
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to verify the information other than by immediately locating
Warden.
Out of Court Statements
Warden also argues that the trial court erred in admitting
the unidentified men's statements regarding Warden's intention to
harm himself. Officer Jensen testified that the men told him the
driver of a white Pontiac had asked them where he could buy some
coke so he could drive into a wall. Warden characterizes the
admission of these statements as consideration of unreliable
hearsay statements in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 801 and
802. Warden analogizes these statements to those of citizen
informants in search warrant cases. He complains that there is
no independent indicia of reliability for statements from
unidentified citizens. The trial court, however, admitted these
statements as evidence of verbal acts, and not for their
substantive truth. The court limited the statements' use to
evaluating the manner in which a reasonable officer would respond
given this information.
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence as a
question of law under a correctness standard. See State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). We conclude the
court correctly limited the admission of the unidentified males'
statements to explain the conduct of the police officer. The
statements were used to explain the officer's belief that the
circumstances were exigent, requiring him to take action for
Warden's safety. See State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah
1987) (officer's testimony as to conversation with confidential
informant was not hearsay because admitted to explain police
conduct); accord Lavton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah
App. 1987) (officer's testimony regarding conversation with store
clerk was not hearsay because admitted to explain police
conduct). Because the evidence of the statements was offered for
a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matters stated, it
was not hearsay and was not excludable as such. Utah R. Evid.
801(c); see Durfev v. Board of Educ., 604 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah
1979) (evidence of utterances offered for purpose other than to
prove truth of matter stated is not excludable hearsay).
Therefore, the court did not err in admitting evidence of the out
of court statements.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we reiterate the three tiered test for
community caretaker automobile stops in Utah. First, the trial
court must determine if a seizure occurred under the Fourth
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Amendment. Second, the court must determine whether the seizure
was in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function.
Third, the court must ascertain whether the circumstances were
such that there was a reasonable belief that the circumstances
posed an imminent danger to life or limb. Under this community
caretaker stop analysis, the officer's stop of Warden was lawful
and there was no error in refusing to suppress the evidence of
criminal activity seized as a result of that stop. Finally, the
admission of testimony of the unidentified males' statements,
explaining the officer's conduct under these circumstances, was
not error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling
denying Warden's motion to suppress evidence and affirm his
conviction.

WE CONCUR:
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